How can I responsibly initiate contact with Microsoft concerning a sensitive security matter that is actively affecting the global email infrastructure?
Confidential Security Matter Impacting Global Email Infrastructure – Request for Responsible Microsoft Contact
1. Abstract:
This investigation has uncovered structural vulnerabilities within the current email ecosystem, unintentionally harming reputable email providers while disproportionately benefiting another major provider in ways that appear strategically exploitative. This issue is neither hypothetical nor isolated; rather, it is an ongoing, intelligently orchestrated tactic operating discreetly, beneath typical detection thresholds.
While immediate financial impacts on affected providers are considerable, the potential for substantial reputational damage is even more critical. Out of ethical and security considerations, I am intentionally limiting disclosures here to responsibly engage Microsoft—a provider clearly positioned not as the exploiter, but as a potential key stakeholder in resolving this issue.
I deeply appreciate your attention and understanding of the necessary discretion this matter demands.
2. Introduction:
To clearly describe observed dynamics while preserving confidentiality, I will use placeholder identifiers:
• XMail.com – An eXploitative email provider employing a subtle, strategic advantage from systemic vulnerabilities.
• NMail.com – A Neutral email provider, unaffected and uninvolved.
• AMail.com – An Affected provider facing immediate financial and reputational consequences.
• AutoBlocker.com – A reputation-based filtering service central to this issue.
• Association.com – An innocent third-party inadvertently exploited in this scenario.
XMail.com, NMail.com, and AMail.com are the three largest global email providers, each individually larger than all remaining providers combined. Microsoft is explicitly not XMail.com, which positions Microsoft ideally as a responsible stakeholder to address this matter constructively.
Structure of this document: 3. Methods – Problem 4. Methods – Solution 5. Results – Analysis 6. Discussion
3. Methods – Problem:
In a well-functioning email ecosystem, reputable providers (XMail.com, NMail.com, AMail.com, and others) detect and report spam to reputation services like AutoBlocker.com. These services apply independent heuristics to prevent misuse. Legitimate entities such as Association.com routinely communicate with their users across all these providers.
However, unusual activity has been observed: messages from Association.com successfully reach XMail.com users but are simultaneously flagged by XMail.com as spam to AutoBlocker.com, undermining email delivery to competing providers. AMail.com, highly dependent on Association.com communications, suffers notable delivery disruptions, pushing users toward XMail.com. This selective delivery pattern strongly implies deliberate strategic manipulation rather than routine spam control.
Significant technical evidence validating this manipulation and methods used to analyze it are withheld here due to potential misuse, available exclusively for confidential stakeholder review.
4. Methods – Solution:
Addressing this issue requires systemic improvement—not additional heuristics, but a lightweight, backward-compatible architectural enhancement to email protocols. This extension introduces memory-like functionalities to servers, differentiating between routine and anomalous communication patterns. It prevents over-reliance on third-party filters and inherently mitigates strategic manipulation.
Developed originally to address spam and security broadly, this solution specifically and efficiently neutralizes the exploitation mechanism described, requiring no client-side adjustments and allowing incremental provider adoption. Implementing this now would significantly enhance the email ecosystem's integrity and security.
5. Results – Analysis:
5.1 Origin: In early 2025, Association.com members reported not receiving critical annual communications. Analysis pinpointed systematic disruption for users at AMail.com and eleven smaller providers, causing direct financial impacts.
Instead of making recommended server changes, we requested temporary delisting from AutoBlocker.com, enabling controlled observation of conditions leading to listing events.
5.2 Observations: Over nine days, controlled tests using consistent infrastructure revealed inconsistent blocklisting by AutoBlocker.com despite uniform sending conditions. Listing appeared independent of volume or content changes, correlated solely with recipient identity—particularly users at XMail.com.
5.3 Quantitative Summary: Repeated tests confirmed erratic listing outcomes despite identical technical conditions:
- Approximately 50% listed without identifiable differences.
- Direct correlation to specific recipient identity rather than message content or volume.
5.4 Detailed Sensitivity Analysis: Two test pairs highlight explicit anomalies:
- SE0072J (not listed) vs. SE0072K (listed): Removal of one XMail.com recipient triggered listing, defying conventional heuristics.
- SE0072Q (larger, not listed) vs. SE0072R (smaller, listed): Larger set containing more XMail.com recipients remained unlisted, invalidating volume-based heuristics.
These results strongly indicate deliberate external manipulation rather than legitimate heuristic-based spam detection.
5.5 Controlled Provider Experiment: A separate controlled experiment validated targeted delivery degradation exclusively affecting XMail.com recipients, with a precise 2.04% bounce rate deliberately maintained to induce targeted harm to competitors like AMail.com.
Critical technical insights and reverse-engineering methods behind these findings are reserved for confidential disclosure due to inherent security risks.
5.6 Conclusion: Our rigorous analysis demonstrates conclusively that AutoBlocker.com blocklistings resulted not from legitimate spam control but from deliberate external manipulation centered exclusively around XMail.com recipients. The broader implications involve substantial systemic risk: a single, well-positioned actor can strategically exploit reputation-based services to harm competitors significantly, without accountability or transparency.
6. Discussion:
This document presents an opportunity for strengthening email ecosystem security. Consistent with scientific rigor and collaborative verification, I invite Microsoft stakeholders to review and independently validate my evidence confidentially.
Two clear paths exist: (1) Evidence is considered incorrect, in which case all parties remain unaffected, allowing open public discourse; or (2) Evidence is credible, necessitating confidential review to mitigate risk and enhance infrastructure.
Proposed next step: a concise 59-minute confidential discussion agenda:
- 4 min – Introductions
- 20 min – Mathematical basis for proposed Email 2.0 architecture
- 20 min – Confidential evidence and analytical methods
- 10 min – Practical, immediately implementable solution
- 5 min – Questions and discussion
I am eager to collaborate constructively toward a more secure, robust email ecosystem. Thank you for your careful consideration.
Warm regards,
Dr. Goran Salamunićcar